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Policy Interact?; and How Transparent
Should a Central Bank Be? * In my
closing remarks, I noted that because
conferences have to be planned so far in
advance, there is always a danger of
focusing on topics that lose their
relevance as the event approaches.  And
the economic changes that occurred
between November 2000 and November
2001 were striking, as the economy
headed into recession and the
September 11 tragedy unfolded. Still, in
my view, the topics discussed at the
Policy Forum turned out to be even
more relevant as the economic
landscape shifted, and the day’s
program generated interesting debate
and discussion and provided numerous
insights.
President Anthony M.
Santomero of the Philadelphia Fed
began the day, pointing out that
Chairman Greenspan moved one aspect
of the first issue, “How Should Monetary
Policy React to Asset Prices?” to the
forefront several years ago and, in the
process, introduced a new phrase into
the financial lexicon. During a speech in
December 1996, with the Dow at 6437,
he posed the now famous question:
“… how do we know when irrational
exuberance has unduly escalated asset
values?” As Santomero said, since that
time, the Chairman’s question has
gotten tougher to answer.  And the
follow-up questions — How do dramatic
shifts in asset values affect aggregate
spending? Should they figure into the
Fed’s monetary policy decisions?  And if
so, how? — are equally tough to answer.
In Santomero’s view, the Fed must take
into account the potential impact of
asset markets on the real economy.
Meanwhile, asset market participants
must take into account the Fed’s impact
on financial conditions, real-sector
performance, and hence the returns on
their portfolios. In his view, the Fed and
the asset markets are locked into a
complicated game. The question is:
What are the rules of that game, and
how should the Fed play it?
Santomero said that the
second Policy Forum question, “How
Should Monetary Policy and Fiscal
n November 30, 2001, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia held its first
Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum, “Three
Questions for Monetary Policymakers.”  This
event, sponsored by the Bank’s Research Department,
brought together a group of highly respected academics,
policymakers, and market economists, for discussion
and debate about important macroeconomic and
monetary policy issues the Fed needed to address in the
coming year.  The Policy Forum was not intended to be
a traditional academic conference on monetary policy,
nor was it intended to be a discussion of issues relevant
to the next FOMC meeting.  Rather, we took a longer
term perspective and tried to engage the right people in
a discussion of current macroeconomic research and its
implications for monetary policy.
Loretta J. Mester







* Many of the presentations reviewed here
are available on our web site at
www.phil.frb.org/conf/policyforum.html.
Last year’s Policy Forum
addressed three questions facing
monetary policymakers: How Should
Monetary Policy React to Asset Prices?;
How Should Monetary Policy and Fiscal  Business Review  Q3  2002   7 www.phil.frb.org
Policy Interact?” has also grown more
important and has become more
complex.  The Fed can move monetary
policy quickly, but the effects of its
actions unfold slowly.  Fiscal policy
actions usually take longer to
implement, but their impact may come
more quickly. (Andrew Abel, another
speaker, elaborated on this point.)  It is
important to address how policymakers
should use the two to provide steady
support for the economy going forward,
add strength if necessary, and ease back
when appropriate.
In addressing the third
question, “How Transparent Should a
Central Bank Be?” Santomero
indicated the case for transparency is a
strong one.  Making the Fed trans-
parent is one way to cut through the
complex interplay between financial
markets and the Fed.  The Fed states
its policy goals and its intended path for
achieving them.  Financial markets
process the information efficiently and
adjust accordingly. Uncertainty and the
risk of confusion are minimized;
efficiency is maximized.  Transparency
also serves the broader goal of building
public confidence in the Fed as an
institution. But Santomero also made
the point that in assessing whether
there is a need for greater transparency
one must consider a tradeoff.  Greater
transparency can improve the Fed’s
clarity and increase its accountability.
But it can also limit the Fed’s
resourcefulness and slow its response
times.  Wise and timely policy decisions
are the product of frank discussion and
open debate among the policymakers,
and maintaining the confidentiality of
those proceedings helps preserve their
frank and open character. In
Santomero’s view, the issue is striking
the right balance of transparency and
confidentiality.
In closing, Santomero made
the point that the issues being discussed
were relevant not only in the U.S. but
to policymakers around the world.
HOW SHOULD MONETARY
POLICY REACT TO ASSET
PRICES?
As pointed out by discussant
Mark Watson of Princeton University,
the first session’s three papers illustrate
that the answer to the question “How
Should Monetary Policy React to Asset
Prices?” depends on the imperfections
and frictions in the economy. The three
papers reached different conclusions
about how monetary policy should
respond, since they assumed different
causes for variations in asset prices.
Fernando Alvarez of the
University of Chicago presented a paper
that investigated how optimal monetary
policy changes when market partici-
pants’ level of risk aversion changes.  In
his model, stock price fluctuations arise
from variations over time in the level of
investors’ risk aversion.  The optimal
monetary policy depends on the level of
risk aversion, since inflation facilitates
risk sharing.  Market participants trade
in the market (incurring transactions
costs) to insure against idiosyncratic
shocks to their income. Inflation reduces
the income of all economic agents, and
at the margin, it compresses the distri-
bution of income, thereby reducing the
need to trade for insurance purposes.
But too much inflation leads everyone
to trade and incur transactions costs.
The optimal inflation rate balances
these two forces.  Risk aversion affects
the amount of trading and therefore
the need for inflation to reduce cross-
sectional income dispersion.  When risk
aversion is higher than average, the
optimal monetary policy is to choose a
lower inflation rate than average; when
risk aversion is less than average, the
optimal monetary policy is to choose a
higher inflation rate than average.
Thus, high risk aversion leads to lower
prices of risky assets and to lower levels
of inflation, and in this sense, optimal
monetary policy is procyclical.
Bill Dupor of the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania,
discussed his work on how monetary
policy should optimally respond to
movements in asset prices.  According to
his model, optimal monetary policy is
contractionary in response to an
inefficient boom in the stock market or
in investment.  Thus, in contrast to
Alvarez, the optimal policy is counter-
cyclical. In Dupor’s model, firms make
investment decisions to maximize the
expected present value of their real
profits, but they sometimes mis-estimate
the future return to their investment.
These mis-estimates drive investment
and asset price movements in the model.
When firms overestimate future returns
to capital, they increase physical
investment and asset prices appreciate.
Optimal monetary policy works not only
to reduce nominal price fluctuations in
the economy but also to reduce these
nonfundamental asset price movements,
since these movements indicate that
firms’ investment decisions have been
distorted.  By running a contractionary
policy in the face of inefficiently high
asset prices, the monetary authority
reduces the return on investment and
lowers the distortion. Dupor’s model
provides a formal justification for
monetary policy to respond to
nonfundamental movements in asset
prices at the expense of nominal price
stabilization.
The third presenter, Mark
Gertler of New York University,
summarized and updated his recent
work with Ben Bernanke.  Asset price
bubbles can cause fluctuations in
spending and inefficient business cycles,
The optimal monetary
policy depends on the
level of risk aversion,
since inflation
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but in designing optimal monetary
policy, the central bank must remain
cognizant of the fact that it cannot be
confident about whether fundamentals
(like an improvement in technology) or
nonfundamentals (a bubble) are driving
asset prices.  Gertler also pointed out
that even if the central bank were
certain that a rise in stock prices was a
bubble, there is a great deal of
imprecision between high frequency
moves in asset prices and spending. In
Gertler’s view, the best feasible policy for
dealing with the harmful effects of asset
price bubbles is a flexible inflation-
targeting strategy in which the central
bank commits explicitly or implicitly to
adjust interest rates to stabilize inflation
over the medium run.  A central bank
that follows an inflation-targeting
strategy should respond to changes in
asset prices only to the extent that such
changes affect the central bank’s
forecast of inflation or deflation,  or
movements in the equilibrium real
interest rate.  This strategy would lead
the central bank to accommodate asset
price movements driven by funda-
mentals but offset nonfundamental asset
price movements that generate
inflationary and deflationary pressures.
Thus, the central bank should not
ignore asset prices; the central bank
should include them in the information
set with which it forecasts inflationary
pressures or movements in the
equilibrium real interest rate.  In
Gertler’s view, inflation targeting
provides a nominal anchor for monetary
policy and has worked well in practice,
although, he points out, such a strategy
has not been stress tested by large swings
in asset prices.
In their work, Gertler and
Bernanke simulated how the economy
would react to a boom and bust cycle in
asset prices when the central bank
practices inflation targeting, that is,
when the monetary policy interest rate
instrument responds primarily to
changes in expected inflation.  They
find that inflation targeting yields good
outcomes, substantially stabilizing both
output and inflation, when asset prices
are volatile. As in Dupor’s model, the
central bank offsets purely speculative
increases or decreases in stock values
that are driven through aggregate
demand, and it accommodates
technology shocks.  They found little
additional gain from allowing monetary
policy to respond to stock price
movements over and above their
implications for inflation. Gertler also
pointed out that aside from the model
predictions, it might be dangerous to
have the central bank attempt to
influence stock prices, since the effects
of such attempts on market psychology
are very unpredictable. Finally, Gertler
presented results suggesting that there is
only an imprecise link between short-
term changes in asset prices and
spending.  While more permanent
changes in asset prices, which change
wealth, lead to changes in consumption
spending (the wealth effect) and
investment spending, the evidence
indicates that short-run changes in asset
prices do not have a large impact on
spending. In Gertler’s interpretation, this
again suggests there is little to be gained
following policies that target asset prices.
Mark Watson of Princeton
University, the first discussant, pointed
out that the three papers all conclude
that monetary policy can act in a way to
ensure and improve macroeconomic
stability. But they differ in their
recommendations of how policy should
behave: Alvarez’s model suggests the
central bank should ease monetary
policy in response to rising asset prices;
Dupor’s model suggests the central bank
should tighten in response to rising asset
prices; and Gertler-Bernanke suggest
that the central bank should essentially
ignore asset prices except to the extent
that asset prices help forecast or signal
something about the overall state of the
economy or inflation. But how useful
are asset prices in forecasting future
inflation or future output? As Watson
points out, the answer is very mixed in
the literature.  Watson’s comprehensive
study with James Stock of Harvard
University of seven countries and 38
asset prices, forecasting over two time
periods (1971-1983 and 1984-1998),
indicates that asset prices are useful for
predicting inflation sometimes and
somewhere, but there is little
consistency and there is a lot of
instability across time. For example,
trying to rely on one or two asset prices
to forecast inflation or output would be a
mistake — the forecasts are too noisy.
But if one combines information from
many asset prices in constructing
forecasts and averages across many asset
price predictors, one obtains forecasts
that are better than those that ignore
asset prices  — essentially, one can
average out the noise.
Ben Bernanke of Princeton
University (and current member of the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors)
stated that the Alvarez and Dupor
papers provide nicely worked out
theoretical analyses of the case for
monetary policy to respond to the stock
market over and above the extent
implied by the market’s implications for
inflation. Bernanke pointed out that this
is true even in the Bernanke-Gertler
model, since stock market bubbles lead
to excessive volatility in investment.
However, in Bernanke’s view the real
question is whether, in practice, we have
sufficient confidence in our under-
standing of stock market behavior and
its response to monetary policy to
improve over an inflation-targeting rule.
He is skeptical that we do or that the
Fed does, and he feels that history
argues against trying to stabilize the
stock market.  While he strongly
encourages the central bank to make
emergency responses to financial crises
to protect the payments system (for
example, the 1987 stock market crash,
the Russian default, September 11),
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to prick stock market bubbles have led
to some very bad outcomes.
Jeremy Siegel of the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania, the
session’s final discussant and moderator
argued that while there is some
empirical evidence that asset prices
might not be that informative about the
economy, in his view, they are becoming
increasingly informative. For example,
consumer confidence is more linked to
the stock market and the cost of capital
is dependent on equity prices. In his
view, there are signals in equity prices
that the Fed should pay attention to.
And he also believes that the Fed
should respond to them, but not with
the aim of pricking a bubble. For
example, to the extent that the late
1990s stock market boom reflected an
increase in productivity and therefore a
rise in the potential growth rate of the
economy, the equilibrium real interest
rate rose. Had the Fed not raised
interest rates, inflationary pressures
would have built. On the other hand, if
the central bank believes that the
market is too high, then in Siegel’s view,
trying to prick the bubble can be risky
because there are lags in the effect of
policy and interactions between policy
and the market.
HOW SHOULD MONETARY
POLICY AND FISCAL POLICY
INTERACT?
A panel of four speakers
addressed our second question.
Andrew Abel of the Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania, started by
laying out and commenting on some of
the channels of interaction between
monetary and fiscal policy, some of
which he feels are more relevant now
than others.  These include financing
and monetizing government deficits;
the effect of inflation on tax rates and
revenues; open market operations in
Treasury securities; the liquidity trap;
lags in monetary and fiscal policy; and
short-run vs. long-run uses of policy.
The first channel, financing
the government deficit, is the oldest and
simplest issue, according to Abel. During
World War II, the Fed cooperated with
the Treasury by keeping interest rates
low to reduce the Treasury’s financing
costs. But since the Treasury-Federal
Reserve Accord of 1951, the Fed has
become independent of the Treasury,
which is not to say that fiscal policy has
no effect on monetary policy.
Inflation affects effective tax
rates, since the tax code is not indexed
to inflation.  Abel pointed out that
Martin Feldstein estimated that a
2-percentage-point reduction in
inflation would increase welfare by 1
percent of GDP per year, through its
impact on effective tax rates. In Abel’s
view a simple and desirable way of
remedying the problem would be to
index the tax code.
Another issue that has become
more topical is how monetary policy
should be conducted in a world with
shrinking government debt. Abel thinks
this is an interesting question; however,
he points out that over the longer run, it
will be much less of an issue, since
government debt will be “back with a
vengeance” in the long run.
Abel said that contrary to some
economists, he does not think the issue
of the liquidity trap applies to the U.S. at
the moment, although it might apply to
Japan, where interest rates had gone so
low that monetary policy had become
an ineffective tool for stimulating
spending. In Abel’s opinion, the
structural problems in Japan, for
example, the weak banking sector, are
quite different from those the U.S. was
facing at the time of the Policy Forum.
In thinking about how
monetary and fiscal policy interact, Abel
outlined three types of lags.  The
recognition lag — how long it takes to
figure out there’s a need for policy
action  — is short for monetary policy,
since the meetings are frequent, and
short to medium for fiscal policy.  The
decision lag — how long it takes to
implement a policy change  — is
incredibly short for monetary policy and
usually long for fiscal policy. Finally,
Abel cites Milton Friedman’s “long and
variable lags” as a good characterization
of monetary policy’s action lag — how
long it takes policy to affect the
economy once it is implemented; the
action lag for fiscal policy, Abel stated,
is medium to long.  Based on this lag
structure, monetary policy should be
used for short-run stabilization, since it
generally has shorter lags.  But in the
long run, monetary policy should focus
on keeping inflation low and stable.
Fiscal policy should be used to achieve
the following long-run goals. First, assess
whether programs are worth what they
cost; whether there are market failures
that need to be corrected; and what
public goods need to be provided. Then
set taxes to collect sufficient revenues
to fund these expenditures in a way
that respects economic efficiency and
equity and that minimizes distortions,
and perhaps meets some redistributive
goals.  In Abel’s view, any short-run
stabilization through fiscal policy should
generally occur through automatic
stabilizers.
R. Glenn Hubbard, chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers,
said he was also skeptical of using fiscal
policy for short-run stabilization.  He
believes that the fiscal policy applied in
2001 was appropriate, viewing the tax
rebates in the spring 2001 tax act not as
a cyclical measure but as down
payments on a permanent tax cut.
Hubbard said the question of how fiscal
and monetary policy should interact is
an important one.  He said the key was
cooperation, not coordination.  When
monetary policy is made, it must
consider current and future fiscal
policy, and vice versa.  The fiscal and
monetary authorities need to
understand what each is doing.  At the
simplest level, this means talking to one
another, and there are a variety of ways10   Q3  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
in which the Administration and the
Fed do communicate with each other.
This is different from coordination.
Hubbard agrees that monetary policy
independence is a key ingredient of
good policy and benefits the economy.
He pointed to the combination of
monetary and fiscal policy in 2001 as an
illustration of the harmonious working of
monetary and fiscal policy in the U.S.
And he stated that he believes that
monetary policy and fiscal policy are
committed to their long-term goals —
for monetary policy, its long-run goal of
price stability and for fiscal policy, its
long-run goal of improvement in long-
term budget balance.
Laurence Kotlikoff of Boston
University disagreed; he thinks that
monetary and fiscal policy have exactly
the wrong long-term goals and direction.
He does not believe monetary policy
and fiscal policy should interact; we do
not want to use monetary policy as a
fiscal instrument.  However, Kotlikoff
believes that in the U.S. they will
interact because of the nature of our
long-term fiscal problems.  Based on his
research, our fiscal policy is highly
unsustainable. Kotlikoff and co-authors
have used generational accounting to
compare the size of the government’s
bills now and in the future to the
amounts available to pay those bills now
and in the future.  These are not in
balance in the U.S — future generations
will face a much higher tax burden than
the current generation, since we are
passing on a large debt to them.
According to Kotlikoff’s research, in the
U.S. it will be difficult to achieve
generational balance whereby the
lifetime net tax rates of future
generations equal that of the current
generation. Other countries facing a
similar problem have used hyperinflation
to bring about balance. Kotlikoff
outlined some alternative policies that
could be used to achieve generational
balance in the U.S., including tax
increases and cuts in transfers and
government purchases. For example,
according to his and his co-authors’
estimates, as of summer 2001, the U.S.
would need to raise federal income
taxes 68 percent or all taxes (local, state,
and federal) 26 percent to achieve
generational balance. Alternatively, it
would take a cut of 44 percent of all
government transfers.  Kotlikoff said
that these numbers were so scary
because the demographics are that bad
— he stated that in 30 years the U.S.
will have twice as many old people and
only 15 percent more workers.  Kotlikoff
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economic growth will bail out the U.S.
from this problem — as the population
ages, there will be a lot of wealthy older
people relative to young workers, which
will lead to more capital per worker,
higher real wages, and capital
deepening.  This would mean that we
would have a higher tax base and that
tax rates would not have to rise as much.
Kotlikoff does not subscribe to this view.
He presented the results of some
simulation exercises that indicate that
instead of capital deepening, the
economy could experience capital
shallowing during the demographic
transition, since payroll tax rates might
have to rise so much. In conclusion,
Kotlikoff said that the menu of things
the U.S. needs to do to solve its fiscal
problem is very painful, but the
unsustainability of our current fiscal
policy should not be ignored, given the
great harm that has been inflicted on
other countries’ economies by their
pension liabilities.
In his response, Hubbard said
that the government’s fiscal situation is
less harrowing than the version
presented by Kotlikoff.  He interprets
Kotlikoff’s research as making the
important point that delay in addressing
the problem is very costly; it is important
to take action.  In Hubbard’s view,
action is being taken.  In his opinion,
there is nonpartisan recognition of the
need to shore up entitlements and avoid
the crisis Kotlifoff discusses, and progress
is being made.
Christopher Sims of Princeton
University concluded the session by
discussing his research program on what
determines the price level in terms of
monetary and fiscal policy jointly, the so-
called fiscal theory of the price level.
Sims explained that this way of thinking
about the price level recognizes that
monetary policy is fiscal policy; there is
no clean distinction between the two.
This might seem to contradict the
notion of central bank independence.
But in most countries, central bank
independence is a convention about
which aspects of fiscal policy are handed
over to the central bank. Monetary
policy has a direct impact on the interest
expenditure component of the federal
government.  A change in interest rates
affects the nominal value of these
expenditures, and inflation affects the
real value.  As Sims sees it, monetary
policy independence is a convention by
which the effects of monetary policy on
the federal budget aren’t subject to
policy dispute and argument between
the Treasury and the central bank. For
example, the Treasury doesn’t complain
to the Fed that there wasn’t enough
seignorage this year or ask the Fed to
lower interest rates because the interest
component of the budget has increased.
Moreover, the Fed and the public are
confident that when the Fed raises
interest rates, the fiscal system will
absorb the costs of increased interest
expenditures in the budget, for example,
by cutting other expenditures or raising
taxes. If this were not the case, a rise in
interest rates could lead to inflation
rather than having the desired
dampening effect on economic activity.
This convention has arisen to help
control the historical tendency of fiscal
authorities to systematically use
seignorage and inflation as a source of
revenue.
Independence is a good idea in
normal times, but it is possible only over
a certain range of conditions.  Sims
argued that if we don’t understand its
nature, that is, that central bank
independence is a convention and
monetary policy has a fiscal impact, then
we can get into trouble in certain
historically unusual circumstances.  For
example, during a liquidity trap, the
central bank might have to change how
it implements monetary policy in order
to have an effect.  Instead of buying
short-term nominal government debt, it
might have to purchase other assets, like
long-term bonds, foreign government
bonds, or loans from banks, which would
expose the central bank’s balance sheet
to risk.  Were the central bank’s balance
sheet to succumb to the risk, the
Treasury would need to recapitalize the
central bank, and it should do so, even
though this would be a breach of the
usual independence between the
central bank and the Treasury.  Another
extreme circumstance is wartime.
During almost every war the U.S. has
fought, a substantial fraction of the
financing of the war has come from
seignorage and inflation.  In Sims’ view,
a surprise inflation that reduces the
value of outstanding government debt
— if used at times of fiscal stress when
the alternative is increased distortionary
taxes — may be a good thing to do.
Sims added that it is obviously not a
good thing to do regularly, and indeed,
it would work only if it were a surprise.
In relating his work to the
economic situation at the time of the
Policy Forum, Sims said he thought it
most likely that the U.S. economy
would not find itself in either of these
circumstances (that is, liquidity trap or
fiscal exigency). However, he said that
one thing we have learned is that
extremely surprising things can happen.
Thus, it is worthwhile having the
discussion.
HOW TRANSPARENT SHOULD A
CENTRAL BANK BE?
Our final session tackled the
issue of central bank transparency, that
is, how the central bank communicates
and explains it actions to the public. In
the view of all the speakers, trans-
parency is beneficial, and central banks
have made progress toward greater
transparency in just a short time. Our
speakers did differ in their assessments
of the amount of progress that has been
made and that still needs to be made.
William Poole, president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
began the discussion, pointing out that
the real questions are how, in fact, to be
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really means.  Poole said that
transparency means providing “the
fullest explanation possible of policy
actions and the considerations
underlying them, in as timely a manner
as possible.”  One benefit of trans-
parency is that it helps policymakers
themselves develop coherent views.
Having to explain things helps clarify
one’s own thinking.  The success of
monetary policy depends on market
expectations and market confidence,
and those will be more accurate and
complete, the better market participants
understand the Fed’s actions. In Poole’s
view, the macroeconomics literature
supports the case for policymakers to
provide as much information as it can
about policy.  This does not necessarily
mean that all disclosures are beneficial,
since meetings held in the open would
yield a different type of deliberation, not
necessarily better policymaking, and the
public might become confused more
than enlightened. But Poole said that
releasing transcripts of FOMC meetings
with a five-year lag, as is current
practice, does not inhibit his discussion
at meetings and provides a valuable
record for scholars. Poole also discussed
some of his research, co-authored with
others at the St. Louis Fed, showing that
prompt disclosure of policy actions
significantly improved the accuracy of
market forecasts of policy actions. Poole
concluded his remarks by indicating two
ways to improve Fed transparency:
announcing an explicit inflation
objective and reducing the statement
released at the end of FOMC meetings
to simple, boilerplate language (since the
current statement is open to a variety of
interpretations and may increase
uncertainty in the market).
Michael Prell, consultant and
former director of Research and
Statistics at the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, indicated
that the amount of information released
by the Fed has increased greatly over
the last 30 years. Prell says this has
served several purposes, including
meeting the demands of Congress,
lowering the “suspicions in some circles
that a secretive, non-elected body is
manipulating the financial markets,”
and increasing the effectiveness of
policy by allowing the markets to better
anticipate Fed policy actions. But in
Prell’s opinion, the Fed has been wary of
transparency over the years.  In his view,
there has been some concern that
greater openness could jeopardize the
Fed’s independence and that markets
might overreact to indications of
potential Fed policy actions, thereby
causing noise that distorts the signals the
Fed could otherwise draw from the
market about underlying economic
pressures.  He does say that the
challenge of transparency is greater
because Fed policymakers can have
disparate analytical views about the
economy, but he is against trying to
regiment these “many voices of the
System.” Rather, he favors allowing
these voices to speak, but in a clearer
fashion.  In his view, the post-meeting
announcements by the FOMC are an
advance in transparency, although they
fall short of desired clarity.  In conclu-
sion, Prell says that the answer posed in
the session, “How transparent should a
central bank be,” is “As much as possible,
without jeopardizing its mission.”
Mickey Levy, chief economist
of Bank of America, provided a private-
sector view. Levy believes the Fed has
dramatically improved its implementa-
tion of monetary policy and its trans-
parency, with the Fed being more
straightforward and understandable.
However, he thinks further improve-
ment could be achieved. In Levy’s view,
the announcements made by the Fed
after FOMC meetings suffer by
emphasizing current economic
conditions rather then the Fed’s long-
run goals.  Levy discussed his analysis of
18 FOMC policy announcements made
between February 2000 and November
2001.  These announcements were
made after the Fed shifted from
providing a statement about its “bias” to
providing a “balance-of-risks” statement.
In Levy’s view, these announcements
fuel market speculation about near-term
monetary policy, just as earlier
announcements that included the bias
statement did.  He also said that the
phrasing of the announcements could
mislead the public into believing that
the central bank’s objective is to limit
economic growth in order to control
inflation, a mistaken view of the
inflation process.  In Levy’s view, the
Fed announcements should “reinforce
its long-run objectives and establish
guidelines to achieve them,” as one of
the goals of transparency is to build
credibility. Confusing statements can be
counterproductive.
Our final presenter on the
topic of transparency was Alan Blinder
of Princeton University, a former vice
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors. Blinder based his
discussion of the “why, what, and how”
of central bank transparency on a recent
monograph he co-authored on
transparency at central banks around
the world (“How Do Central Banks
Talk?” A. Blinder, C. Goodhart, P .
Hildebrand, D. Lipton, and C. Wyplosz).
In his view there has been a revolution
in central bank thinking on the subject
of transparency over the past five to 10
years — a very short period of time.
Blinder and co-authors begin with the
presumption that central banks should
reveal almost all information; while
there will be some pieces of information
that should not be revealed, the central
bank must have a good reason not to
reveal them.  In other words, the central
bank should reveal enough information
so that interested observers understand
what it is doing, why it is doing it, and
how it makes decisions, and this
includes forward-looking information.
For the “why” of transparency,
Blinder cited two reasons. First,
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accountability.  Second, transparency
aids the effectiveness of monetary
policy, which works through
expectations.  Blinder said that in his
FOMC experience, one of the more
difficult parts of setting monetary policy
was in understanding the transmission of
changes in the fed funds rate to other
interest rates and asset prices in the
economy. In his view, transparency helps
tighten the “gearing” between what the
Fed does and what the market does in
reaction to what the Fed does.  The
central bank should try to condition
expectations and teach the markets to
think like it does. Blinder thinks that
theoretical arguments for mystery and
surprise do not hold up well to real-world
circumstances.
The “what” of transparency
involves the central bank’s articulating
its objectives.  This is more difficult for
central banks such as the Fed that have
multiple objectives (price stability and
sustainable economic growth), and
somewhat easier for central banks with a
single objective, such as inflation-
targeting.  Blinder said the central bank
also needs to reveal its methods,
including forecasts and models, for
reaching policy decisions. He noted that
the details of the forecast (for example,
forecasts of housing starts seven quarters
from now) are less important to most
people than the broad contours of the
outlook.  He also favors the central bank
giving forward-looking indicators (for
example, the “balance-of-risks” or the
“bias”) of future policy actions.
The “how” of transparency
depends on how monetary policy
decisions are made at the central bank.
Blinder and co-authors categorize
central banks into three types: decisions
made by an individual (for example, the
Reserve Bank of New Zealand);
decisions made by a collegial committee
that works to reach a consensus (for
example, the European Central Bank);
and decisions made by an “individual-
istic” committee in which people vote
what they believe and the majority rules
(for example, the Bank of England).
Blinder and co-authors believe that the
modes of being transparent are different
in these three cases.  As a simple
example, consider the question of how
much to reveal in statements versus in
the minutes of the meeting.  When the
decision is made by an individual there
is no meeting and so no transcript to
issue. But then it is important for the
individual decision maker to explain
fully his or her rationale for the decision.
With an individualist committee, it is
difficult to explain the diverse views in a
statement.  For Blinder and his co-
authors, if the committee is collegial,
there is a real danger in having a
cacophony of voices, which may provide
a lot of noise without providing any new
information.  However, if the committee
is an individualistic one, differences in
opinions across committee members are
very relevant and give forward-looking
information to the market. In this case,
Blinder (like Prell) thinks communica-
tion should be encouraged.
Blinder agreed with the other
speakers that the Fed has become more
transparent over time, pointing out that
it was only in 1994 that the Fed began
announcing its decision after FOMC
meetings. Unlike Levy, he views the
“balance-of-risks” statement as a vast
improvement over the “bias” statement.
He agrees with Prell that the statements B R
have improved over time, but he also
agrees with Prell and Levy that there is
further to go in making the statements
more informative.  And while he
“philosophically” agrees with Poole that
the transcripts are valuable scholarly
records, he believes the cost has been
too great in terms of stultifying
conversation and debate; so he favors
discontinuing verbatim transcripts of
FOMC meetings.  To conclude, Blinder
laid out what he would like the Fed to
do: clarify its objectives, publish its
forecasts, and make fuller statements.
In particular, Blinder said this will
become much more important in the
post-Greenspan era, when the markets
have to learn and understand the Fed’s
decision-making under a new Chairman.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: THE
CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL:
TRANSFORMATION TO
TRANSPARENCY
Dr. Arminio Fraga, Governor
of the Central Bank of Brazil, delivered
the keynote address. Fraga presented an
overview of the reforms that have been
implemented by the Central Bank of
Brazil to increase the level of transpar-
ency. Included in the reforms was a
move to inflation targeting. Fraga
discussed the steps the Central Bank has
taken to announce its targets and
disclose information about its policy
meetings and its economic models. He
also discussed the benefits of such
reforms and the progress that has been
made on the inflation front in Brazil
since the reforms have been imple-
mented. In Fraga’s view, over the years,
Brazil has been a laboratory; it has had
to deal with many of the issues research
economists in the Federal Reserve
System, other central banks, and
academia have studied. In Fraga’s
opinion, the Central Bank of Brazil’s
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We will hold our second annual Philadelphia Fed Policy
Forum on November 22, 2002 (the Friday before
Thanksgiving).  This year’s topic is “Crises, Contagion, and
Coordination: Monetary Policy Issues in a Global Context.”
At right is the program. The Policy Forum brings together a
group of distinguished economists and policymakers for what
we hope will be a rousing discussion and debate of the
issues. For information on attending this year’s event, please
contact us at PHIL.Forum@phil.frb.org or visit our web page
at www.phil.frb.org/conf/policyforum2002.html.  Business Review  Q3  2002   15 www.phil.frb.org
The Philadelphia Fed Policy Forum
Crises, Contagion, and Coordination: Issues for Policymakers in the Global Economy
November 22, 2002
The Pennsylvania Convention Center, Room 113
Presentations
Welcoming Remarks
Anthony M. Santomero, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Financial Crises
Moderator and Discussant: Loretta J. Mester, Director of Research, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
“Financial Crises in Emerging Market Economies”
V. V. Chari, University of Minnesota
“Foreshadowing LTCM: The Crisis of 1763”
Hyun Song Shin, London School of Economics
Financial Contagion and Business Cycle Correlation
Moderator and Discussant: Sylvain Leduc, Senior Economist,Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
“Financial Stability and Currency Areas”
Franklin Allen, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
“Globalization of Financial Turmoil”
Graciela Kaminsky, George Washington University
Policy Coordination
Moderator, Presenter, Discussant:  Lawrence Christiano, Northwestern University
“The Gains from International Monetary Cooperation”
Kenneth Rogoff, Economic Counselor and Director, Research Department,
International Monetary Fund
“On the Fiscal Implications of Twin Crises”
Martin Eichenbaum, Northwestern University
“Monetary Policy After a Financial Shock”
Lawrence Christiano, Northwestern University
Policymaking in a Global Context
Moderator and Panelist:  Anthony M. Santomero, President, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Other Panelists:
Urban Bäckström, Governor, Central Bank of Sweden
Paul Jenkins, Deputy Governor, Bank of Canada
Robert Parry, President, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco